The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) succeeded in preventing the insurgents from capturing state power by force. Nevertheless, the actual counter-insurgency operations revealed some of the fundamental and inherent weaknesses of the RNA as regards its organization, recruitment, preparation, training, grooming of officers, intelligence, operations, logistics, system of reward and punishment, command and leadership.

When the insurgents were eliminating the police force in the country's remote areas, the RNA knew very well that it would have to be mobilized sooner or later to combat the insurgency. But it remained indifferent to the situation as if everything would be fine by the blessings of Lord Pashupatinath. As a result, the insurgents, equipped with a few 303 rifles and homemade weapons, managed to attack and overrun the Dang army barracks, which provided them a large number of modern weapons, ammunition, explosives and equipment for the first time. 

The RNA's training hardly paid any serious attention to the importance and sensitiveness of human rights issues, ignorance of which ultimately caused the greatest damage to the image and operation of the army. Moreover, during actual face-to-face combat with the insurgents, the RNA troops could hardly use the fundamental military tactic of fire and manoeuvre. And while each defensive position (comprising approximately 150 personnel) that fought successful defensive battles fired more than one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition plus several explosives in one night, the number of insurgents that fell was less than 50. The RNA's training doctrine, which is generally based on foreign training doctrines, and false and unrealistic assumptions proved to be ineffective and irrelevant.

Distortion of information and reports happened to be the major disease afflicting the army. Almost every unit or formation distorted reports to demonstrate its effectiveness, which caused numerous problems and a number of major disasters. Lack of good logistic support was another chronic problem, which limited the combat effectiveness of the troops. Ironically, while the troops were bleeding on the battlefield, the great game of commission, especially in the procurement of arms, ammunition and equipment, went on as usual.

Most probably, the RNA would have lost the overall battle without the dedicated support of Number 11 Brigade and its brave pilots and crew members who supported the fighting units, day and night, even in difficult terrain and weather conditions. Had the extremely bad weather conditions not prevented these brave pilots, the defensive position at Pili could have been definitely saved. In fact, the troops remained too dependent on air support, especially during contact with the insurgents. 

It is an established fact that troops in the field give their best only when they perceive their commanders to be ready to share the risks of war. Several RNA officers commanded their units with distinction which was instrumental in successful battles in several places. At the same time, in many cases the field commanders proved to be grossly unprofessional and incapable of leading and commanding the troops. Many of them never conducted operations on their own without the support of expensive Special Forces Units from the Strategic Reserve Forces. They rarely left their fortified positions in the barracks, inducing junior commanders and troops to do the same. Their main aim appeared to be to complete their command tenure as soon as possible, by hook or crook, and move to safer assignments and enjoy the perks. This was a serious flaw in the army's training of leadership and command.

Throughout the insurgency period, the Army HQ faced tough problems to find capable and confident officers to assign to command appointments in the field. At the same time, the Army HQ faced difficulty in posting many officers who were deemed to be unfit to command. It simply meant that the selection, recruiting, training and grooming system of the officers in the past was very faulty and highly manipulated.

Some officers and commanders were crowned and others put on the cross for the same kind of action. Some soldiers and officers that deserted their positions and comrades during the heat of battle were set scot-free, which became a precedent thereafter adversely affecting the combat effectiveness, motivation, unit cohesion and morale of the troops engaged in the most serious business of life and death. 

The basic duty of the military in peace time is to train the troops and commanders so that they are selflessly motivated to fight effectively in war. The deliberate evasion of combat duty is considered to be an unpardonable sin for a professional soldier. President Eisenhower faced an ethical dilemma in 1952 when the U.S. Army posted his son, Major John, to an infantry unit fighting in North Korea. That assignment involved the real possibility of his getting killed or captured and the president being blackmailed. However, Eisenhower, himself a great professional soldier, allowed his son to carry on with his new assignment with one firm condition -- he would accept the risk of his son being killed or wounded, but his son would take his life before being captured.

In our case, however, while the army was engaged in the most serious business of war on its own land and suffering an acute shortage of capable officers to command the troops on the field, the Army HQ allowed many officers to opt for easy and lucrative UN assignments and overseas courses. The army did not seem to be seriously concerned with defeating the insurgents. Moreover, though a number of sincere professional officers lost their near and dear ones in combat, many senior officers unethically managed to manipulate their posting in order to spare themselves and their relatives in the army the risks and dangers of war. 

To conclude, the National Security Doctrine/Strategy at the macro level is required to cater for two types of conflicts which a nation may face: first, an insurgency, and second, a protracted war of national liberation which may be required if and when foreign powers invade and occupy our nation. The lessons learnt from the counter-insurgency campaigns of the RNA could be useful for combating insurgencies. And how the Maoists conducted their insurgency campaign could provide valuable insight into how to organize, initiate and sustain a protracted war of national liberation to drive away foreign powers occupying our country. Nothing but an objective and detailed investigation of the armed conflict that Nepal faced can provide the insights required. The findings of such an objective investigation must be used to restructure the Nepal Army to successfully meet the security challenges of the future.